2015 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
RELIGIONS AND POLITICS
IN CONTEMPORARY CHINESE SOCIETIES

Palacký University, Olomouc, Czech Republic
April 3rd – April 4th, 2015
Dear Colleagues, Guests and Friends,

It is my honour and my pleasure to welcome all attendees of the international conference “Religions and Politics in Contemporary Chinese Societies” in Olomouc. This conference, from its very first conception almost two years ago, until the present meeting here – in the wonderful environment of the former Jesuit convict and its Corpus Christi Chapel – has had quite a special history and unique development. It is necessary to declare, that the event is sponsored by CHINET, a project funded by the EU Social Fund. However, you might like to know, what exactly this project is. What structure and function does it have? What are the benefits that the project has gained for the Asian studies community in the Czech Republic?

I think that most of these questions can quite easily be answered when examining this event and its history. Five out of the six keynote speakers I have met on my CHINET conference or research trips where we first started discussing their possible participation. Our conference is co-organised by the Department of Asian Studies at Palacky University Olomouc together with the Department for the Study of Religions at Masaryk University in Brno. Yet, there is a number of institutions, platforms and persons who have helped to shape this small, but rather special academic event, and who have helped to promote the conference around the European academic community and beyond. To mention at least the most involved of them, was Martina Rysová, Lenka Kliková, Martin Lavička and Jarmila Fiurášková of the great CHINET team, who did most of the organising work! It was Jakub Otčenášek, an expert on Chinese religion from Charles University in Prague, and Dr. Jakub Hrubý, Head of the East Asia Section of the Oriental Institute at the Czech Academy of Sciences in Prague, who helped greatly with the conference supporting programme in Prague. In the promoting of this event, credit goes to Richard Turscányi from Masaryk University representing The Institute of Asian Studies (www.asian.sk), the independent partner organization CENAA based in Bratislava (Slovakia), and to the whole team of my wonderful young colleagues from Brno, who have just founded a new online platform Přeszedď.cz that aspirates to bring more light and information into key issues of contemporary Chinese society for the Czech audience. Finally, I have to mention my good friend, and for the last three months a great assistant, Martina Čermáková, a postgraduate student of history at Brasilian Universidade Federal da Grande Dourados, who has also helped very much.

This is, from my point of view, a concrete outcome of the CHINET project – an open network of experts, researchers, students, institutions and platforms that are all involved in Asian/Chinese Studies in the Czech Republic, and that have amazing contacts, relationships and cooperation with the international academic community. All of this has been supported and secured by the CHINET project within the last two years.

I hope that one result of this networking, our conference, will also be beneficial for you. I believe you will enjoy your time spent in Olomouc by meeting new colleagues and old friends, by discussing and sharing with them.

Pavel Šindelář
29th March 2015 in Brno
One of the most unexpected developments for the last three decades in the realm of social policy China since the beginning of the reform and opening policy is the steady growth of Buddhist philanthropy as a network of foundations, merit societies and a variety of philanthropic associations providing a vast array of social services. Prof. Laliberté’s talk will present the policy context in which Buddhist institutions have been invited by local officials in China to assist them in the provision of disaster relief, support of students in impoverished parts of the country, help to the elderly, and participation in poverty alleviation. His talk will review, along with the legal and administrative framework that have shaped from the beginning Buddhist philanthropy, the changing political context that has allowed for an increasingly large array of possibilities. His talk will offer evidence from his fieldwork over the last ten years in diverse locations throughout China. Prof. Laliberté will briefly sketch the early emergence of Buddhist philanthropy, and review the different contributions made by different kinds of organizations at the provincial, municipal, and temple-level. He will reflect on the key role of Taiwan-based Buddhist institutions involved in the delivery of social services and how they have contributed to social services in Mainland China. The talk will conclude with some reflections on the future of Buddhist philanthropy’s contribution to China’s current welfare regime, acknowledging the political and institutional obstacles that remain in place to limit the expansion of Buddhist philanthropy in the near future.

Short Bio

André Laliberté (UBC 1999) is full professor at the School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa, where he teaches on the politics of China and comparative politics. His current research looks at how governments rely on religious resources to legitimize their social policies, and how they interact with religious institutions in the delivery of services, with a special focus paid to the emerging challenges of the work of care in Sinitic societies. He has co-edited with Bruce Berman and Rajeev Bhargava Secular States and Religious Diversity (UBC Press 2013), and has written The Politics of Buddhist Organizations in Taiwan (RoutledgeCurzon 2004).
An important indicator in the course of state regulation in the religious sphere is the legislative regulation and practice of applying the law in relation to property of religious organizations. A study of the changes in the status of property of religious communities allows us to deepen our understanding of policy in the sphere of religion in China and trace its transformation at various stages. Throughout the history of the People's Republic of China, the religious policy of the Communist Party of China has undergone powerful transformations which reflect the changes in the regime’s attitude towards religion. The situation with religious property at various stages of development of religious policy vividly demonstrates these changes. As a rule, transformations in these stages took place upon the adoption by party-state organizations of a landmark document. The issue of religious property in China is quite delicate, while the policy and methods applied in practice are very chaotic. One of the fundamental problems of regulating religious property is the abundance of forms of property. The greatest difficulties are created by the huge party bureaucratic apparatus. Into the sphere of religious policy there have been drawn numerous organs of power with blurred functional obligations, while the resolution of issues of religious property also concerns organs responsible for the preservation of monuments of culture, the tourist sphere, the sphere of property, town planning, and so on. There is also the problem of the contradictions between religious organizations and the state departments for cultural values in the issue of resolving what belongs to whom of objects of religious property. Our study sheds light on the deficit in the understanding of the problems of the religious property in the history of China.

In the discussion about religion, especially, Christianity, in contemporary China, the market theory of religion is very prevalent, behind which is the theory of rational choice. The market theory intends to take religion as a commodity, which is up to the rational choice of a rational actor in order to satisfy his or her intrinsic spiritual needs, while maximizing gains and minimizing losses. Besides the promotion of religious freedom, in this paper, I would suggest three other possible political implications of the market theory. First, it may generate the
marginalization of some so-called “irrational” believers, most of which fall into the categories of the elderly, the female, and the poor. Taking Christianity as an example, those people are often condemned as rice-bowl believers, whose religiosity is scarcely taken into serious consideration. This kind of so-called “irrational” believers, however, often takes a strikingly large percentage of Christian congregations. Second, the overemphasis of the market theory may kindle political turbulence. The “rational ideal” of the market theory is many times in conflicts with the “irrational reality” in China. Following the ideal blindly may cause political turbulence. Third, the market theory may limit the government’s agenda in terms of religion. This theory intends to separate people’s spiritual needs from their other needs. Interviews with religious converts often suggest that people many times go to religion when they cannot satisfy their worldly needs, such as the need for health. Due to the limitation of this theory itself, its followers often suggest the government to provide as much as religious freedom, while neglecting the necessity for the government to improve people’s worldly situation at the same time. Based on the above possible political implications of this theory, I suggest a need for different paradigms in researching religions in China.

12:00–12:30

THE CHINESE WORLD VIEW, HUMAN TRUST, SATISFACTION, HUMAN BEHAVIOR, LIFE PURPOSES AND VALUE SYSTEM VIA THE EXAMPLE OF A CHINESE RURAL SMALL TOWN

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The lecture summarizes the results of a one month survey questionnaire research performed in a rural small town of China called Qinhuangdao. The pilot study was administered on a 103 person sample. The explorative research compares the results of the Chinese sample to similar data of the European communities of the ESS (European Social Survey) in six research topics: world view, human trust, satisfaction, human behavior, the purpose of life and human values. In the center of the world section the Chinese responders' opinion is that Beijing has the greatest charisma, the biggest influence from a cultural perspective, and also from the aspects of politics, new ideas and new technologies. As for military, Washington takes the first place, as does New York from an economic point of view and also with regards to new life style, as well as Paris from the aspect of fashion. The responders rated their own country best on the areas of social justice and dynamic economic development, but China has also received a better evaluation than other countries compared as for moral values, rule of law, safety and honesty. The results of my Chinese research show that Chinese people are considerably more trustworthy and helpful than their European counterparts. Honesty is the third most important human characteristic. However, this third "place" is the European level of trust worthiness that is in Europe people consider others honest almost to the same extent as do the Chinese respondents. Based on the data of the Chinese research sample, the Chinese are most satisfied with their own country, but they rate the economic status of their country also at a prestigious place. They are least satisfied with the status of healthcare and education. The general satisfaction of people included in my Chinese sample is considerably higher than the average of the Europeans. As for human values, I used Schwartz's value test consisting of 21 value variables. According to the Chinese data, the most important value is the safety of their mother country, followed by
the ambitious values of the world of beauties, freedom, family safety, politeness, respect for others. The least preferred values are: an interesting life, social prestige, material welfare, obedience, trustworthiness, being good tempered, helpfulness, being disciplined, having a creative spirit, joy of the work done and respect for traditions. According to the LVPLS model set up for the structural connection of the value indicators and life purpose indicators, values serving individual interests influence life purposes serving community interests to a greater extent.

11:00–12:30 AUDITORIUM (PARALLEL SESSION B)
RELIGION AND MINORITIES
CHAIR JAKUB OTČENÁŠEK

11:00–11:30
“CHINESE EMPEROR” CHINGGIS KHAN IN PRC´S STATE DOCTRINE
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The policy of “reforms and opening-up” brought significant change to the Chinese attitude towards ethnic minorities. The most important was political incorporation into a “Chinese Nation”. These processes influenced the historical narration, were some of the Han Chinese heroes were replaced by the ethnic minority heroes. Mongols are a special case, as the legacy of the founder of the great Mongolian empire is too important for the Chinese to be ignored. The cult of Chinggis Khan remains an important part of religious life of Mongols in today’s China. His worship is not a centralized monolith and is practiced in various forms. What is specific for China’s Mongols (as in contrast to the Mongolian state) is the institutions of cult like darkhats, temples and shrines. What is more, its importance goes beyond the spiritual activity, as it has an impact of the social and political identification of the Mongolian nationality. Presence of the Chinggis Khan in public sphere is not only an example of controlled acquiescence of demonstration of nationalism. It turned out to be useful tool in building national and territorial unity of “Greater China”. This situation affects not only internal affairs but it also has an impact on relations with neighbour countries. Chinggis Khan is not the only Mongolian hero, who became an icon in China. The case of a rebel Gadameiren provides another example of unlimited creativity of an interpretation, which is coherent with Chinese state ideology.
ON “THE DOUBLE RELIGIOUS FAMILY” IN CONTEMPORARY CHINESE SOCIETIES: TAKING THE SHANG-XIA-LAN VILLAGE IN GUANGDONG PROVINCE FOR EXAMPLE

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Traditional religious faith of She ethnic minority group in P.R.China is primitive religion, which includes the worship of nature and ancestors. The worship core of She ethnic minority group adores their forefathers. The religious feeling comes from consanguineous family, which repel other religions, but Christianity can exist and develop in there. This paper bases on field work in the Shang-Xia-Lan village of Zhangxi She ethnic minority group country in Guangdong Province of P.R.China, analyses respective character of the religion in She ethnic minority group and in Christianity, puts forth the model of “the double religious family”, interprets the factors of coexistence and development of the religious faith of She ethnic minority group and Christianity in contemporary Chinese societies.

“LITTLE APPLE” AND OTHER STRATEGIES TOWARDS THE UYGHUR MINORITY IN THE XUAR

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Strategies how to contain China’s most troubled region vary; however all of them seems to be quite unsuccessful in calming down the situation there. Gradually, Chinese government's policies have been tightened up the security in the region as a precaution again terrorism, but again these hardline strategies seem to have the opposite effect on the public order, instead of solving the problem, the situation in Xinjiang has worsened. In this paper I will discuss the current strategies of the central and local government and their influence on everyday lives of Uyghur minority.
The lecture takes a conscious adaptation of the old feminist slogan ‘The personal is political’ as starting point for its investigation of the link between religion and politics in contemporary China. It argues that the link between the spiritual and the political is more complex and more multi-faceted than the familiar tales of repression and resistance imply. The lecture will start by examining the most obvious link between personal faith and political action by looking at the example of prominent dissidents and lawyers. It will argue that the link between personal faith and political action is only very tentative and that many additional factors come into play. It will continue with a discussion of the link between personal and public moral standards and the utility of an individual’s religious values in the building of the state project, which now also includes ‘gross national happiness’. The talk will further examine the way in which Chinese gender roles and relations are impacted and reinforced by religious values and will conclude with a critical examination of religious values and personal bias in the media coverage of religious issues in China. The talk concludes by asking how new spiritual practices and their associated language and expressions find their way into political ideology and in what way they are tapped into to support the status quo, or to lend legitimacy to an ideological project. We need to move away from examining religion in China through the lens of state repression only; at the same time, we generally need to consider spirituality at more than just the individual level of experience and practice. To appropriate the old feminist maxim, the spiritual is political – not just in China.

Short Bio

Gerda Wielander is Head of Modern Languages and Cultures and Associate Professor in Chinese Studies at the University of Westminster, London. She obtained an MA and PhD from the University of Vienna. She is the author of Christian Values in Communist China (Routledge 2013) as well as various articles and book chapters on different aspects of Christian thought and belief in contemporary China, on social organizations and the meaning of socialism in the Chinese context. She is now working on ‘happiness’ in contemporary Chinese political discourse.
Studies of Comparative Politics have long associated Protestant Christianity with liberal democracy. Protestants have been credited with promoting individualistic, egalitarian values, encouraging lay activism, agitating for religious toleration, and spreading the use of printing and education. In doing so, they unintentionally laid the foundation for the development of the public sphere, civil society, and religious toleration, all necessary for the development of liberal democracy. This raises the question of what effect the recent rapid growth of Protestantism will have on China's politics. This paper, based on 100 in-depth interviews in Shenzhen and Beijing, focuses on Protestant believers’ political values and on their attitudes towards China's political institutions. In terms of political values, Protestants were no more liberal than their demographic peers, except on the question of freedom of association. Protestants also showed similar levels of overall political tolerance to their demographic peers. However Protestant respondents were more concerned with, and positive about, democracy, which they defined primarily in liberal rather than populist terms. Protestants demonstrated more negative attitudes towards the central government, the political system and the Party. For non-Protestants, regime support was associated with positive perceptions of everyday issues such as education, healthcare, and personal living conditions, whereas for Protestants, such perceptions made little difference. In causal terms, my findings concur with those of previous scholarship in that it was primarily those dissatisfied with China's society and politics who converted to Protestantism, rather than Protestantism serving to engender contrarian sentiments. As such, Protestantism Christianity’s primary challenge to Party-state legitimacy is in what it represents: a symptom of an underlying reservoir of scepticism towards the Party-state and its attempt to legitimise its authoritarian rule based upon its performance at delivering everyday political goods.
The church demolitions and forced removal of crosses in Zhejiang has received a great deal of attention both within China and in the Western media. Much of the analysis on the situation in Zhejiang has been concerned with trying to determine the “why’s” and the “wherefore’s” of state action. This paper, however, will discuss the wider effects of events in Zhejiang. Based on interviews conducted in various locations in the Huadong region in the summer of 2014, this paper will argue that the demolition of churches and church crosses is a potential catalyst for millenarian beliefs within popular Christianity in the region. While much of the research on millenarianism has focused on specific movements, I will utilise the concept of millenarianism in this paper as a “body of underground ideas and thought which circulates in a community.” The paper will analyse how the Zhejiang events have resulted in many Protestant Christians interpreting these events as indicative of the “Last Days.” The paper will further argue that the state’s approach to managing religion places an emphasis on dealing with specific groups but largely ignores the potential for a “body of underground ideas” which can be catalysed by external events. This paper will further our understanding of the potential impact which political campaigns can have on popular Christianity and what resources individual believers draw on for making sense of them.
15:00–16:30 AUDITORIUM (PARALLEL SESSION B)
RELIGION ON THE CHINA’S PERIPHERY
CHAIR DAN SMYER YU

15:00–15:30
A STUDY OF GONGBEI (SHRINE) CULTURE
AMONG THE HUI PEOPLE OF XINJIANG, CHINA

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"Gongbei" is a Chinese transliteration from Arabic word "Qubba". Originally it meant simply "a domed building". People of the Hui ethnic minority call the graves of certain influential Islamic persons "Gongbei". The important place of these Gongbei in the religious and social life of Menhuan (Sufi believers cannot be ignored. Research on this “Gongbei culture” is a prerequisite for a comprehensive understanding of the characteristics and essence of the Hui Islamic faith in Xinjiang. In this thesis, based upon extensive field work, I have made the history and legends of Gongbei as the focal point of my research. Initially, I will seek to discuss objectively the origins of Gongbei, and then to classify it. Secondly, I will set forth my findings from the comprehensive comparative research on the worship customs, appendages, architectural styles, and functions of different types of Gongbei. Finally, I present my analysis of the shared Gongbei culture between the Hui and the Uyghur peoples, both of whom worship at these Gongbei, as well as the reasons for this overlap in practice. Through combining field investigation with theoretical materials, I have tried to discover the different characteristics of three Islamic Menhuan’s Gongbei culture among Xinjiang Hui minority and the differences between Menhuan and the other Islamic branches. This will better illustrate the effect of Islamic culture on the history and present day life of the Xinjiang Hui, as well as provide a new research perspective from which to study the Islamic faith of the Xinjiang Hui.

15:30–16:00
TIBETAN BUDDHISM AND FREEDOM OF RELIGION
– BEYOND MYTHS AND STEREOTYPES

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Tibetan Buddhism – a worldwide-popular religion, usually associated with the iconic personality of 14th Dalai Lama. However, the Western Buddhists tend to forget about the Tibetan origins of this religion, about the culture, geographical and political conditions that influenced its development. All around the world, the Tibetan question has been discussed. Although the topic has to great extent died down after the Olympic Games in Beijing, but the human rights activists still demand a real autonomy for Tibet. The problem of religious freedom in Tibet has been discussed for a longer time, for sure a lot of myths and stereotypes has already appeared. Not everywhere in Tibet monks immolate themselves, crying for Dalai Lama's return. Not everywhere it is forbidden to keep a photo of His Holiness. Scandalous images spread fast and easily around the Internet, producing a pars pro toto impression – if one monk suffers, all of them suffer. What is the truth, then? How does the actual situation in Tibet look like? In my
work. I am going to refer to quite an up-to-date book by Robert Stefanicki, entitled „Czerwony Tybet” („Red Tibet”). The author has visited Tibet three times and has made numerous observations on everyday life of the Buddhists. The paper's arguments are also going to be based on interviews with Tibetans (for security reasons, they are going to remain anonymous) and with people who visited Tibet as tourists. I am going to try to present an actual picture of religious freedom in Tibet, basing mainly on the sources mentioned above. I am also going to refer to my own experience and observations that I have made in Dharamsala (McLeod Ganj and Gyuto monastery).

16:00–16:30

THE “CHINESE EMPIRE”: RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND CONTEMPORARY TEMPLE ARTS OF HAN NATIONALITY IN THE EAST OF QINGHAI PROVINCE

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Based on the author's anthropological fieldwork in east of Qinghai province from 2011 to 2013, this article aims to explicate how the contemporary Han artisans in this region utilize art symbols to represent the metaphor of the Chinese Empire in the local temples and how these representations reinforce the identity of Han nationality in this multicultural area. In the local religious beliefs, the metaphor of the Chinese Empire is spatial. Its territory is determined by divinities of territory: divinities of mountains and divinities of lands. Choosing the Tibetan style or Han style to represent these divinities reflects underlying values in the local culture and society. The metaphor of the Chinese Empire is also temporal, which mixes the ancient and the modern world. Representations of Legends of emperors in different dynasties and presidents in the republic help the construction of this metaphor. Located in the frontier this Chinese Empire, the question of the centre and the frontier is also important. Where is orthodoxy centre, in Tibet or in the Chinese mainland? Han artisans have their own responses in their art work according to their personal religious beliefs.
In this talk (paper) I discuss the creative and destructive roles of money in the revitalizations and spread of Tibetan Buddhism in China. Based on my ethnographic work, I wish to present an argument that the growth of Tibetan Buddhism in urban China is a dynamic interplay of concurrent creation-destruction, meaning that the market creatively destroys traditional forms of Tibetan Buddhism while it simultaneously destructively creates new forms of its practice. In both ethnographic and theoretical terms I discuss how money, the primary indicator of wealth in the Chinese market economy, functions as the principal creation-destruction instrument simultaneously converting religious desires to commercial values and engendering what I call “the charismatic community” of Chinese Tibetan Buddhists with its moral dilemma concerning the religiosity of money and the spirituality of Buddhism. I hope to engage a meaningful thought-exchange with the audience concerning the multi-dimensional encounters of the worldly absoluteness of money and the sanctified inalienability of Buddhist teachings in the politics of religion and ethnicity in contemporary China.

Short Bio

Dan Smyer Yu is Distinguish Professor and Founding Director of Center for Trans-Himalayan Studies at Yunnan Minzu University and a core member of the Transregional Research Network (CETREN) at University of Göttingen. Prior to this faculty appointment he was a Research Group Leader at Max Planck Institute for Religious and Ethnic Diversity and a New Millennium Scholar at Minzu University of China. He is the author of The Spread of Tibetan Buddhism in China: Charisma, Money, Enlightenment (2011) and Mindscaping the Landscape of Tibet: Place, Memorability, Eco-aesthetics (2015). His current research interests are religion and ecology, landscape and emotionality, transboundary state effects, hydraulic politics, climate change and heritage preservation, and Buddhism and peacebuilding.
KEYNOTE LECTURE

09:00–10:00 CHAPEL
RELIGION AND RURAL-URBAN IMMIGRATION: AN APPROACH TO STUDY ASSIMILATION IN CHINA

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China’s rural-urban immigration over the last thirty years has received much attention from the academia in recent years. Numerous empirical studies of new immigrants have dealt with the topic of assimilation or social inclusion in various aspects -----economic, cultural, social and psychological. This research will focus on the issue of religion and spiritual life among the immigrants in China. We will first describe the widely spread religious phenomena among rural-urban immigrants in various cities, and try to address the following issues: First, what make religious belief, practice, organizations and values meaningful to those people whose primary goals in the urban were material oriented? Second, within the same religious group, does religion play the role of assimilation or segmentation between the new immigrants and the urban citizens? Third, which religious beliefs and practices will be strengthened or weakened in the process of rural-urban migration --- comparisons between the institutional religions (5 official recognized religions) and diffused religions (Chinese traditional beliefs, include ancestor worship, community rituals and temple festivals)? Fourth, is there any chance for religious innovation among the rural-urban immigrants with new life experience? And finally, is there any possible change of public policy on religious affairs in the re-structure of religious landscape in China.

Short Bio

Fan Lizhu 范丽珠 is Professor of Sociology at Fudan University. Managing Vice Director, Fudan-UC Center on Contemporary China based in UCSD. As a pioneer scholar on the study of sociologist of religion in China, she has engaged in historical and ethnographic studies of Chinese folk religious beliefs, sociological theories of religion, and the study of the trends of folk religious beliefs in modern Chinese society.
This article examines a memorial service held in Xiamen in 2010 for John Otte, an American missionary who dedicated his life and was buried there in 1910. In the communist regime’s political discourse, ever since the Opium War the Western missionary endeavor was linked with imperialism and colonialism. Even though Otte had been dead for half a century, he was denounced as “imperialist rogue” under Mao’s movements. Finally he was completely forgotten by the locals. Since the commemoration service, however, all charges against Otte were overturned, and even he was highly commended as “Xiamen’s Bethune.” From the negative label “imperialist rogue” to the positive recognition as “Xiamen’s Bethune,” the popular discourses on this missionary have been totally reversed. This article attempts to explain what cultural mechanisms made it possible for the grassroots community and the Xiamen church to counter official amnesia and gradually break the state domination of missionary narratives. A secular grassroots community, rather than the local church, played a leading role in the negotiation with the local state. Through recreating a historical figure, the locals successfully contested the official narratives. Because of the application for World Heritage Sites of Gulangyu island, the pragmatic authorities reappraised the value of church legacy and gave more social space to Christianity.

The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan (PCT) is not just religious organization, but also movement for social change and political rights. The church is very active in many different social events, as charity, education, health care... The church has proclaimed to become prophet for Taiwanese nation and critic of social and political iniquity. In this paper I would like to focus on fight for local languages during martial law (1945-1987). During this period the ruling Chinese Nationalist Party Kuomintang (KMT) enforced strict Mandarin Language Policy. People were forbidden to speak other languages in public sphere and in religious and educational institutions. This law was thus very negatively reflected by PCT, because they use local languages in their missionary work. They had been translating Bible and other Christian books into these languages, because only in native languages people were able to understand the Gospel. Under such pressure of the ruling KMT the PCT started in 1970s publishing official statements, which were political and it also criticized the government. The aim of this paper is to observe how has
the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan struggle for usage of local language during martial law? The paper is based on text analysis and interpretation – it analyzes some important documents (重要文献) of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan written 1971 - 1987, and tries to interpret them in historical and cultural context of their origin. Afterword’s the answers of this study are extracted from this interpretation. This study will not only answer this question, but it will also show what the relationship between state and Christian organization was in this period of time.

11:30–12:00

**THE OLD AND THE NEW – THE SINAZATION OF PROTESTANT CHRISTIANITY AS A REACTION TO CURRENT RELIGIOUS POLICY ISSUES IN CHINA**

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In the summer of 2015, the 60th anniversary of the Three Self Patriotic Movement of the Chinese Protestant church made headlines in Germany with titles such as “China to develop its own version of Christianity”. While the unusual attention of the nationwide media was probably due to a lack of “worthy” news during the summer break, the question of the meaning of the ongoing movement for the “sinization of Christianity” (基督教的中国化) remains. Is it simply part of the overarching “Chinese dream” and other attempts to create a uniquely Chinese identity for the world power in the making? Is it only a continuation of previous politics of cooptation that exhorted official churches to “adapt to socialism” and “reconstruct their theological thinking”? In this paper, I propose that besides these familiar themes, there are new elements to the “sinization of Christianity”. As such, it can be read as a reaction to changes within Christianity that pose specific religious policy issues. In particular, the call for the “sinization of Christianity” is a reaction to the increasing global interconnectedness of Chinese Protestantism. Moreover, the growing interest in denominational theologies threatens post-denominationalism as a “Chinese way” of Protestantism. Similarly, ongoing government initiatives for interreligious dialogue point to efforts of (re-)creating the religious tolerance associated with traditional Chinese religions, where growing efforts of Christians to proselytize among their Muslim compatriots might cause social disharmony. Wenzhou, as the central point of government efforts in 2014 to reign in Protestant Christianity, is emblematic of the above trends, and correspondingly was the chosen location for a recent “study meeting” aimed at launching further efforts to “sinize Christianity”.


Several years ago, Falun Gong began to adopt a new means of spreading their message and waging their political struggle, namely by overprinting renminbi notes of various denominations with their slogans and pithy versions of their teachings. As this paper money (and in one or two rare cases coins) travels around China, passing from hand to hand, Falun Gong propaganda journeys across social and economic networks. This paper looks closely at some examples of this phenomena, elucidating the messages on the banknotes and considering this as a strategy of resistance.

Short Bio

Benjamin Penny is a historian of religions in China who has worked on medieval China, the nineteenth century and contemporary times. His most recent book is The Religion of Falun Gong (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012) and he is currently working on a monograph concerning expatriate scholarship in Shanghai after the first Opium War, as well as co-editing East Asian History. He studied at the Universities of Sydney, Cambridge, Peking and the ANU. In July 2010 he was appointed to the Deputy Directorship of the new Australian Centre on China in the World, ANU, and head of the China Everyday research stream. He is currently Acting Director of the Centre.

In 1685 the Orthodox Priest Maxim Leontiev came to Beijing with a group of Russians captured by the Manchu in Albazin, and as a result of this the first Orthodox Chapel appeared in the Qing capital. In 1715/1716, the first Russian Ecclesiastical Mission headed by Archimandrite Illarion, formed according to the edict of Peter I, arrived in China. The Ecclesiastical Mission operated for about three centuries. Russian missionaries gradually established a small Orthodox community in Beijing. During the Boxer Rebellion, the Mission was destroyed, and 222 Chinese Orthodox Christians were killed. Since 1917 the Orthodox Mission began to focus on
the spiritual care and moral support of a large group of refugees from the Soviet Russia. By 1949 parishioners included not only Russians but also approximately 10000 Chinese converts. The Chinese Autonomous Orthodox Church was granted autonomy by the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church (its Mother Church) in 1956, and Vasily (Shuan) was consecrated as the Bishop of Beijing. By that time the Chinese Orthodox Church had reached its greatest numbers. There were more than 100.000 communicants in Manchuria alone, with 200 priests in 60 parishes, several monasteries and a seminary. In other parts of China, there were 200.000 Orthodox Christians and 150 parishes. Unfortunately, many churches were destroyed during the Cultural Revolution (the most famous of them was St. Nicholas' Orthodox cathedral in the centre of Harbin), and the number of believers at that time was sharply reduced. In the late 1960s, the Chinese Autonomous Orthodox Church practically ceased to exist and has not fully restored up until now. Today in China the total number of Orthodox believers ranges from 12.000 to 15.000. Orthodox Christianity now is not included into the official list of all China religions, and is considered to be the religion of the Russian minority. The main problems of the Orthodox Church in China lie in the lack of clergy, which, in turn, results from the fact that, on the one hand, a proper theological education is not available in the country, and, on the other, they are not authorized to ordain priests.

**15:00–15:30**

**THE HOLY SEE AND CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY**

**STANISLAV MYŠIČKA**  
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Catholic Christianity is one of the officially approved religious affiliations in contemporary PRC. As in the case of religious beliefs generally, the Communist state sets strict rules for regulating and controlling the functioning of the Catholic Church in China. This has also some interesting international implications, because as the result of mutual disagreements over religious policy of the Communist government there is still no official Sino-Vatican diplomatic relations in place. Vatican diplomatically recognizes Taiwan, as the only country in Europe. Taiwanese president Ma attended pope Francis’s inaugural mass, and Taiwanese vice-president attended canonization of John Paul II. and John XXIII. On the other hand, Vatican’s insistence on naming bishops is seen by the PRC as an interference in its domestic affairs and therefore unacceptable. With the new leadership in Vatican and the PRC – general secretary and president Xi Jinping and Pope Francis – there are some signs of hope for future bilateral relations. However, some signs of better Sino-Vatican relations are paralleled by last year’s widespread crackdown on various dissident groups, including underground Christians. This paper analyses the relation between inner and outer PRC’s policies toward the Catholic Church. The paper will try to elucidate how the domestic context shapes foreign policy decisions in the particular context of Sino-Holy see relations. The author will argue that China’s attitude towards the Holy See is to large extent determined by its domestic security agenda and its search for international status.
This study examines the up and down of Confucianism in China over the last one hundred years as the result of the East-West cultural conflict. In particular, this study attempts to understand the relationship between the ongoing revival of Confucianism and Chinese cultural identity. It explores the origin of the anti-tradition radicalism in the New Culture Movement and its further development in the communist movement of Maoism as well as its negative impact on the Chinese identity building. With a general review of the nationwide revival of Confucianism since the post-Mao reform, this study concludes that the Chinese are reaching back to their cultural tradition while marching to the future with a reconstructed Chinese identity.

Short Bio

Dr. Na Chen 陈纳 received his academic degrees from Peking University in China and the University of Pennsylvania and Temple University in the U.S. He has taught at Shanghai Normal University and Fudan University in China, and Wabash College in the U.S. Currently he is a research fellow at the Center for Social Development, Fudan University, and research associate at the IR/PS, UCSD. His research interests include sociology of religion, sociology of development, and intercultural communication. He has published dozens of papers and book chapters both in Chinese and English. His recent research includes an ethnographic study of the “Confucian Congregation” in Southeast China, the current revival of Confucianism and the reconstruction of Chinese identity, etc.
3rd–4th April 2015

Conference venue: the Corpus Christi Chapel, Auditorium Maximum (Art Centre), Univerzitní Street no. 3, Olomouc
OPTIONAL PROGRAM FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS

Thursday 2nd April 2015

Olomouc free city tour

Where: meeting point: in front of the Art Centre, Univerzitní Street no. 3, Olomouc
When: 15:00–18:00

Get-together pre-conference dinner (paid by the participants themselves).

Where: Side Street – Grill and Bar, Kapucínská Street no. 1, Olomouc
When: 19:00–24:00

Sunday 5th April 2015

Trip to Svatý Kopeček (The Holy Little Hill),

a place of pilgrimage located 8 km from Olomouc. The main sightseeing sites are the Baroque pilgrimage church with a two-tower frontage, monastery and the zoo, which is submerged in the forest in the hills above the town.

How: Guided by Chinese studies’ students, max. 4 hours, the exact time depends on the interest and needs of participants.

EASTER IN OLOMOUC

Winter is (not really) over and spring is coming. Celebrate its arrival in Olomouc! Easter market with traditional Czech products, Easter workshop and local folklore music and dance performance are going to take place at the weekend.

Saturday 4th April 2015

Easter farmer’s market

When: 8:00-14:00
Where: The Upper Square

Sunday 5th April 2015

A performance of Czech folk songs and Czech folk dances, Easter market and Easter workshop

When: 10:00-12:30
Where: The Upper Square
The course is co-funded by the CHINET project (reg. no. CZ.1.07/2.3.00/20.0152). This project is co-financed from European Social Fund and State financial resources.